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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK LEFEVRE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060974-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of 
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree 
felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; 
and interference with an arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor 
(R. 175-77).1 This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's suppression 
motion where the uniformed officer observed defendant, a known 
drug abuser, exhibiting multiple classic symptoms of central 
1
 The two drug charges were subject to enhancement because 
defendant committed the crimes in a drug-free zone and had two 
previous drug-related convictions (R. 181: 134-35). 
1 
nervous system stimulant use; where the officer observed what 
appeared to be a lightbulb, commonly used as a drug pipe, 
protruding from defendant's pants pocket; and where defendant 
used violent physical force to resist the officer's attempt to 
frisk him? 
This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's factual 
findings underlying its ruling on a motion to suppress. However, 
it grants the trial court no deference regarding the application 
of law to underlying factual findings. State v. Garcia, 2007 UT 
App 228, 1 7, 581 UT Adv. Rep. 19. "The trial court's ultimate 
determination of the level of a police stop is a legal conclusion 
which [this Court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Bean, 
869 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated. . . . 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
interference with an arresting officer (R. 1-2). After a 
preliminary hearing and bindover to district court, defendant 
filed a suppression motion, which the trial court denied (R. 66-
2 
76; R. 107-13 at addendum A). A jury convicted defendant as 
charged (R. 155). The court sentenced defendant to concurrent 
terms of zero-to-five years in prison, 365 days in jail, and 180 
days in jail, with credit for time served (R. 175-77). The court 
ordered the sentence to run consecutive to the prison sentence 
defendant was already serving (Id.). Defendant filed a timely 
notice of appeal (R. 178-79). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On a September night in 2005, Officer John Barson, a Provo 
police officer and drug recognition expert, was acting as a 
"cover officer" for several other officers who were investigating 
an unrelated incident in a well-lit parking lot of an apartment 
complex (R. 112, R. 180: 5, R. 181: 44-45). Standing away from 
the other officers, Barson either heard or peripherally saw 
defendant approach him from behind (R. 180: 14, R. 181: 46). 
2
 To confirm the correctness of the trial court's ruling on 
defendant's suppression motion, the State cites to the trial 
transcript as well as to both the court's pretrial ruling on the 
suppression motion and the preliminary hearing testimony. 
Appellate courts that consider both pretrial and trial evidence 
in reviewing a pretrial ruling generally do so only in the 
context of affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. United 
States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 
114 S. Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 
1239-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basev, 816 F.2d 
980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 
1054 n.l, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Duncan, 879 S.W.2d 
749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong, 883 P.2d 
686, 688 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1994) (reversal). The principle 
unifying these cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but 
will not reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the 
district court at the time it ruled. To date, Utah has not 
considered the question. 
3 
Barson turned and saw defendant "walk[ing] directly towards me, 
and then within a few feet of me actually deviated his course and 
walked past me, coming within four or five feet of me" (R. 181: 
46, R. 180: 5). 
The first thing Barson noticed about defendant was his 
"unusual" manner of walking (R. 181: 47; accord R. 180: 15, R. 
112). He testified, "[Defendant] walked in almost a march, a 
soldier or very aggressive soldier[-]style clipped walking 
manner" (R. 181 at 46; accord R. 112, R. 180: 5). Barson then 
described in more detail what he saw: 
As I observed him I noted that his hands were 
down the sides and he was clenching and 
unclenching his hands as he walked. As he 
approached me, he wasn't looking directly at 
me. As he turned away from me, he jerked his 
head to the side, looked at me, and then 
jerked it back to center, more aggressively 
than I just did, rather than just turning his 
head and looking at me, as normally would be 
done. . . . I also noticed, as I observed his 
hands, that in his right front pants pocket, 
the top of a lightbulb was protruding from 
his pants. 
(R. 181 at 47; accord R. 180: 5-6). Continuing to observe 
defendant, the officer noted that defendant "with his hand, 
touched the lightbulb, realized that it was exposed, lifted his 
shirt, the tail of his T-shirt up, and pulled it down over the 
lightbulb to conceal it from me, it appeared" (R. 181: 49, R. 
180: 6). 
Tallying his observations, Officer Barson concluded: 
The combination of his mannerisms, the way he 
was walking, the head motion, the clenching 
4 
of the fists, those are all very classic 
indicators of the presence of a cental 
nervous system stimulant. Uncontrolled motor 
contract - or muscle contraction, and the 
presence of the lightbulb, which is a very, 
very common mechanism used to consume 
methamphetamine, I believed he was in a [sic] 
possession possibly of paraphernalia and that 
he was under the influence of a central 
nervous system stimulant, such as 
methamphetamine. [3] 
R. 181: 49; accord R. 180: 6, 9). The officer's conclusion 
comported with his prior knowledge that defendant was a 
methamphetamine user (R. 112, R. 180: 6). 
Still engaged in his duties as cover officer, Barson watched 
defendant walk across the parking lot, get into a vehicle, start 
the engine, and begin backing out of a parking space towards 
Barson and the other officers in the parking lot (R. 111-12, R. 
180: 6, 17; R. 181: 50). At this juncture, free from his other 
responsibilities, Officer Barson walked towards the vehicle to 
investigate his suspicions, drawing defendant's attention by 
knocking first "very loudly" on the trunk lid and then on the 
rear and front driver's side windows (R. 180: 7; accord R. 181: 
50). Barson told defendant through the mostly open driver's 
window that he needed to speak with him and that defendant was 
not free to leave (R. Ill, R. 180: 7, R. 181: 50). Defendant 
responded by asking "Why?," closing the window to within an inch 
3
 A second officer, also present in the parking lot, 
described defendant's unusual physical movements as "clucking," 
which he explained as "involuntary jerking of the hands, the head 
. . . . that's pretty consistent with seeing a stimulant, like 
methamphetamine, cocaine[-]type drug" (R. 181: 97). 
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of the top, and locking the doors (R. 180: 7, 17; R. 181: 51). 
Barson told defendant he was conducting an investigation and 
asked for his driver's license, registration, and proof of 
insurance (R. 180: 7, R. 181: 51, 74, 76). Defendant slipped his 
license through the crack in the window (R. 180: 7, R. 181: 51, 
52) . 
Officer Barson testified that he observed defendant become 
frantic inside the vehicle (R. Ill, R. 180: 8, R. 181: 51). He 
"was turning around and looking directly behind him, looking at 
360 degrees, through all the windows . . . [in] constant motion, 
twisting around inside the seat" (R. 180: 8, 9). Barson surmised 
he was checking to see if he could escape (R. 180: 8, R. 181: 51-
52). Barson's concern for his own personal safety increased when 
he saw defendant begin to pick up and move items inside the 
cluttered vehicle (R. 181: 52). He instructed defendant to turn 
off the engine (R. 180: 8). Defendant initially refused, engaged 
in several verbal exchanges with the officer through the cracked 
window, and then eventually complied (R. 180: 8-9, R. 181: 52). 
With defendant still in the locked vehicle and none of his 
suspicions allayed, Officer Barson reiterated that he still 
needed to talk with defendant and that he was not free to leave 
(R. Ill, R. 180: 8, R. 181: 52). Seeing defendant "continue[] to 
flip around very frantically inside the vehicle, looking outside 
of all the windows," and "worried about [his] safety," Barson 
ordered defendant to get out of the vehicle (R. 181: 53). 
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Defendant refused. Barson ordered him out a second time. 
Defendant then tried futilely to put the car into gear (Id., R. 
180: 9). Finally, when Officer Barson drew his weapon and tapped 
on the glass, defendant unlocked the doors and complied (R. 180: 
20, R. 181: 54). 
Barson reholstered his weapon. As defendant got out of the 
car, Barson saw "an approximately three-foot long flat blade 
screwdriver tucked between the edge of the driver's seat and the 
door, right underneath [defendant's] left hand" (R. 181: 54). 
Concerned about other weapons, the officer instructed defendant 
to turn towards the vehicle for a Terry frisk (R. 180: 10). 
Instead, defendant moved towards an opening between Barson and 
another officer who had approached (R. 181: 54). Barson 
attempted to put defendant against the vehicle to frisk him, at 
which point defendant "began to flail his arms and attempted to 
twist around away from [the officer]" (R. 180: 10). The two 
officers took defendant to the ground, face down. Defendant 
lifted his waist and buttocks, twisting violently, while Barson 
tried to use his own knee to push defendant back down. In the 
process, defendant's tailbone hit Barson's knee, "bruising the 
top of [his] knee rather severely" (R. 181: 55; accord R. Ill, R. 
180: 10). 
The two officers finally succeeded in handcuffing defendant. 
Officer Barson testified, however, that defendant "continued to 
struggle. We had to hold him on the ground for several minutes 
7 
until he calmed down" (R. 181: 56). The officers eventually 
stood defendant up. Searching his pants pockets, they found the 
light bulb, which had been hollowed-out to use as a pipe, and 
three baggies with a total of nearly 20 grams of marijuana (R. 
Ill, R. 180: 10-11, R. 181: 56-59, 109). Searching his vehicle, 
the officers found a small duffle bag containing a used glass 
methamphetamine pipe (R. 110-11, R. 180: 11, R. 181: 62-63). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted 
his suppression motion because Officer Barson lacked reasonable 
suspicion to justify a level two seizure of defendant, let alone 
probable cause to justify a level three arrest. See R. 68-72. 
Consequently, he contends, all evidence seized should be 
suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful detention. See R. 66-67. 
Defendant's argument lacks merit. The officer had 
reasonable suspicion to effect a level two detention. He 
observed defendant exhibiting multiple classic symptoms of 
central nervous system stimulant use. He observed what appeared 
to be a lightbulb—commonly used as a drug pipe—sticking out of 
defendant's front pocket. He also knew the defendant was a 
methamphetamine user. As the trial court ruled, "These are 
reasonable, articulable facts that amount to more than a mere 
hunch that the defendant possessed illegal drugs'' (R. 109-10 at 
addendum A). 
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Based on articulated reasonable suspicion, the officer 
executed a level two detention, making clear his intent by 
repeatedly telling defendant he was not free to leave. 
Subsequently, when defendant used physical force to resist the 
officer's frisk, the officer had probable cause to escalate the 
encounter into a level three arrest and conduct a search of 
defendant's person and vehicle pursuant to that arrest. The 
trial court so ruled and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
SUPPRESSION MOTION WHERE THE UNIFORMED 
OFFICER OBSERVED DEFENDANT, A KNOWN 
METHAMPHETAMINE USER, EXHIBITING MULTIPLE 
CLASSIC SYMPTOMS OF CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM 
IMPAIRMENT; WHERE THE OFFICER OBSERVED WHAT 
APPEARED TO BE A LIGHTBULB, COMMONLY USED AS 
A DRUG PIPE, PROTRUDING FROM DEFENDANT'S 
PANTS POCKET; AND WHERE DEFENDANT USED 
VIOLENT PHYSICAL FORCE TO RESIST THE 
OFFICER'S ATTEMPT TO FRISK HIM 
Defendant argues on appeal that he was subject to a level 
two seizure, unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, 
he asserts that all evidence subsequently seized from him must be 
suppressed as a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Br. of Aplt. 
at 7-8. 
The trial court agreed that the encounter began as a level 
two seizure but found ample reasonable suspicion to support it. 
See R. 109-10 at addendum A. In addition, the court determined 
that when defendant forcefully resisted the officer's attempt to 
9 
frisk him, the officer lawfully escalated the encounter to a 
level three arrest. See R. 108-09. Then, pursuant to the 
arrest, the officer lawfully searched defendant's person and 
vehicle. Consequently, the trial court denied defendant's 
motion. 
The trial court's ruling is correct. At this juncture, 
defendant does not dispute that he was subject to a level two 
seizure.4 See State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 
1994)("[A] level two stop, or a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, occurs when the officer Aby means of physical 
force or show of authority has in some way restrained the 
liberty' of a person" (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 552 (1980))). Indeed, where the officer explicitly 
told defendant he was not free to leave, there can be no question 
that he was seized. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 
(1991) (seizure under Fourth Amendment will be found if, "taking 
into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, 
the police conduct would ^have communicated to a reasonable 
person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence 
and go about his business'") (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 
4
 Defendant made a different argument in the trial court. 
There, he argued that he was subject to a level one voluntary 
encounter. See R. 69-71, 110. For this reason alone, this Court 
may choose to reject his claim. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 689 
P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984)(defendant must specifically state to trial 
court same grounds for objection that he presents on appeal). In 
any event, his appellate claim fails on the merits. 
10 
U.S. 567, 569 (1988)); accord Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; State 
v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah App. 1997). 
The issue, then, is whether Officer Barson had reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant. This Court has stated: 
To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, 
the seizure must be based on specific 
articulable facts which, together with 
rational inferences drawn from them, would 
lead a reasonable person to conclude 
defendant had committed or was about to 
commit a crime. 
State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State 
v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987)). There is no 
bright line test for determining when reasonable suspicion 
exists. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991). 
Courts employ a totality of the circumstances test, recognizing 
that police officers, by virtue of their specialized experience, 
can sometimes recognize illegal activity where ordinary citizens 
would not. Svkes, 840 P.2d at 827; State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 
1363, 1366 n.2 (Utah App. 1987). 
In this case, Officer Barson, with ten years' experience and 
training as a drug recognition expert, articulated several 
behavioral anomalies that he observed in defendant and knew were 
associated with central nervous system stimulant use. 
Specifically, he cited defendant's strange, "soldier[-]style 
clipped walking manner," his jerky head movements, and the 
repeated clenching and unclenching of his hands (R. 181: 46, 47, 
49; R. 112). As part of the totality of the circumstances, the 
11 
officer was aware that defendant was a methamphetamine user (R. 
180: 6). Finally, the officer observed a light bulb protruding 
from defendant's pants pocket and then saw defendant cover it 
from his view with his shirt tail (R. 181: 49). The officer also 
knew that light bulbs are commonly used as pipes to ingest 
methamphetamine (Id. at 48). Under the totality of these factual 
circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain and 
investigate defendant for possession of paraphernalia and 
possession or use of controlled substances.5 
Lawfully detained pursuant to reasonable suspicion, 
defendant refused to cooperate with the officer. Locked in his 
car with a single window cracked open, defendant initially 
refused to turn off the engine and get out of the vehicle (R. 
181: 52-54). When he finally complied and Officer Barson tried 
to frisk him for weapons, defendant forcefully resisted by 
flailing his arms and trying to twist away, requiring two offices 
to subdue him (Id. at 55). As soon as defendant began forcefully 
interfering with the officer who lawfully detained him, he 
committed a crime in the officer's presence, thus giving that 
officer probable cause to escalate the encounter into a level 
5
 Indeed, Officer Barson also had a duty to investigate 
further. State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah App. 
1994) (when police officer observes conduct raising suspicion of 
criminal activity, officer "*has not only the right but the duty 
to make observations and investigations to determine whether the 
law is being violated; and if so, to take such measures as are 
necessary in the enforcement of the law'") (citation omitted). 
12 
three arrest. See. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Utah 2004) 
(criminalizing interference with arresting officer). At that 
point, Officer Barson was fully justified in searching both 
defendant's person and his car incident to his lawful arrest. 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); State v. Trane, 
2002 UT 97, f 23, 57 P.3d 1052 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count each of possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a third degree felony; possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; and interference with an 
arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^day of August, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
13 
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Margaret P. Lindsay, 90 East Center Street, P.O. Box 
1895, Orem, Utah 84059, this fB^day of August, 2007. 
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Addendum 
r\\-tzu 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah Coumy, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARKLEFEVRE, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 051404084 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court having 
carefully considered and reviewed the file in this matter, the memoranda submitted by both parties, 
having heard oral arguments, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court now hereby makes the 
following Ruling. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. The defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof on May 
30, 2006. 
2. The State filed a Response on June 13, 2006 
3. The defendant filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress on June 22, 
2006. 
4. On July 5,2006 this Court calendared the matter for oral arguments. Both parties submitted 
and this Court indicated it would rule in writing. 
/~» -e -* f\ 
II. 
FACTS 
1. On September 20, 2005, officers of the Provo Police Department responded to a call at 250 
South 1000 West in Provo, Utah. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 4:24-25 (May 17,2006). There, the officers 
were met by a number of individuals in an apparently threatening situation. Id. 
2. In the course of performing his duties relative to the call, Officer Barson noted Mr. Lefevre -
the defendant in this case - walking past him demonstrating a robotic, "soldier like" motion. 
Prel. Hrg. Tr., 5:12-18. 
3. Officer Barson also noted that Mr. Lefevre repeatedly flexed his hands into fists. Prel. Hrg. 
Tr. 6:1-2. 
4. The officer additionally noted what appeared to be a lightbulb protruding from Mr. Lefevre's 
pants pocket. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 6:1 -6. These observations occurred in the parking lot area of an 
apartment complex. 
5. Officer Barson was (and is) a certified Drug Recognition Specialist, and was familiar with the 
outward symptoms caused by the use of particular drugs. Specifically, the officer understood 
that jerky, robotic movement is oftentimes an indication of methamphetamine use. 
Additionally, Officer Barson knew that hollowed-out light bulbs are used as a kind of "make-
shift" pipe for the ingestion of methamphetamine. 
6. In addition to these facts, the officer was personally acquainted with the defendant and was 
acquainted with the defendant's history of drug abuse. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 6:9-14. While relevant, 
this fact is less significant and given less weight than the other observations and absent the 
preliminary observations could not form a basis for further inquiry. (It would have been a 
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Level I encounter.) 
7. Officer Barson, on foot, followed the Mr. Lefevre and observed the defendant enter a vehicle 
and attempt to drive away - apparently while under the influence of some type of drug -
Officer Barson, still on foot, stopped the vehicle and attempted to engage Mr. Lefevre in 
discussion. Prel. Hrg. Tr, 6:17-7:5. 
8. Mr. Lefevre expressed his desire to not speak with the Officer Barson and attempted to drive 
away. Officer Barson replied that the defendant was not free to leave and requested the 
defendant's identification. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 7:20-8:3. 
9. Apparently, the officer had to repeat several times to Mr. Lefevre that he was not free to leave. 
Prel. Hrg. Tr., 8:7-12. 
10. Officer Barson noted that Mr. Lefevre's movements in his vehicle were frantic and constant. 
Prel. Hrg. Tr., 8:15-9:2. Additionally, the officer noted that Mr. Lefevre's eyes were blood-
shot. Prel. Hrg. Tr, 9:10-12. 
11. After some time Mr. Lefevre voluntarily exited his vehicle, but when Officer Barson 
attempted to perform a weapons search of the defendant, he began resisting and "flail(ing) his 
arms." Prel. Hrg. Tr., 10:3-8. 
12. A nearby officer helped Officer Barson gain control of Mr. Lefevre. 
13. The incident was violent enough that Officer Barson sustained a severe bruise to his knee. 
Prel. Hrg. Tr. 10:10-12. 
14. Once Mr. Lefevre was in custody the officers proceeded to search his person. They 
discovered he was, indeed, carrying a hollowed-out light bulb that had apparently been used 
as a drug pipe. Additionally, Mr. Lefevre was in possession of marijuana. Prel. Hrg. Tr. 10: 
14-23. 
15. A "search incident to arrest" of Mr. Lefevre's vehicle revealed additional drugs, and drug 
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paraphernalia. Prel. Hrg. Tr. 11:11-12:13. 
III. 
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
The defendant argues that Officer B arson violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching 
his person without so much as reasonable suspicion. Thus, evidence obtained as a result of the 
unwarranted search and illegal detention should be suppressed. 
The State, on the other hand, argues that Officer Barson's and the defendant's interaction 
began as a Level II encounter supported by reasonable suspicion. Additionally, the State argues that 
Officer Barson had probable cause to affect an arrest of the defendant because of his refusal to 
cooperate with the investigating officers and that the illicit materials discovered in subsequent 
searches were properly discovered by the officers. 
III. 
LEGAL DISCUSSION 
At the outset, this Court rejects the defendant's characterization of the initial contact between 
Officer Barson and the defendant as being a Level I encounter. To properly affect a Level II 
encounter Officer Barson needed reasonable articulable facts that justified his further investigation 
of the defendant. See, State v. Menke, 740 P.2d 1363 (Ut App. 1987). It is clear to this Court that 
those facts were present. The officer observed motion consistent with illicit drug use. The officer 
observed what appeared to be a lightbulb commonly used as a drug pipe. The officer was also aware 
of the defendant's history of drug abuse1. These are reasonable, articulable facts that amount to more 
1
 As stated in section II of this ruling, the defendant's history of drug use would notbo an 
appropriate sole basis for an officer to conduct a Level II encounter. However, that fact, when viewed in 
connection with the totality of the circumstances presented here, reasonably heightened Officer Barson's 
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than a mere hunch that the defendant possessed illegal drugs. See, id. Also, as the State correctly 
points out, Officer B arson did not merely have the option of investigating the defendant, but rather, 
the officer had the duty to investigate whether the law had, or was being broken. See, State v. Contrel, 
886 P.2d 107, 110 (Ut. App. 1994). This Court notes that the defendant attempted to drive away 
while apparently under the influence of drugs. Thus, the defendant presented a potentially serious 
threat to the innocent traveling public. That fact alone, in the view of this Court, demanded that the 
officer investigate the defendant. 
The defendant makes much ado about his attempt to drive away and the officer's refusal to 
let the defendant depart. Were this a case of a Level I encounter that argument would hold sway with 
this Court, but, as stated above, the reasonable facts as articulated by Officer Barson vitiates that 
argument. This was clearly a lawful Level II encounter from the outset. Consequently, the 
defendant's subsequent resistance to, and interference with, the lawful orders of Officer Barson and 
other involved officers was a violation of the law. 
Utah law provides that:"(l) A person is guilty of interference with a public servant if he: (a) 
uses force, violence, intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to interfere 
with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an official function." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-301 (a) (2005). The State has also correctly cites Utah case law relative to interference which 
states that "it must appear that a duly constituted public officer engaged in the performance of an 
official duty was obstructed or resisted by the defendant." In re State in Interest of Hurley, 501 P.2d 
111 (Utah 1972) (internal citation omitted). 
The defendant's actions while in his vehicle with Officer Barson attempting to engage him 
suspicion and became part of the circumstances that justified investigation of the defendant. The 
defendant's history is an ancillary, supporting fact. Officer Barson would have exceeded legal bounds if 
he had detained the defendant simply based on the defendant's history. A level I encounter would be as 
far as the Officer could go without other suspicious facts or evidence. 
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in conversation were certainly uncooperative and could, by a jury, be found to meet the statutory 
definition of interference. Those actions, quite possibly, met the probable cause standard necessary 
for Officer Barson to escalate to a Level III encounter. Whether that was the officer's intent or not 
is unclear, but in this Court's view at the point that the defendant began to interfere with Officer 
Barson's proper Level II encounter and investigation, Officer Barson was justified in escalating the 
encounter. 
If there were any doubt about the defendant's attempt to interfere with and resist the officers, 
the defendant did away with that doubt by his overt resistance once outside of the vehicle. From that 
point on, the officers were certainly justified in detaining, searching, and arresting the defendant. His 
actions easily meet the Level III encounter probable cause threshold justifying arrest. A search 
incident to arrest of the defendant's person and of the vehicle he had just exited was justified. 
Consequently, this Court cannot find that any of the illicit drugs, or accompanying paraphernalia was 
improperly obtained, and should, thus, be suppressed at trial. 
IV, 
RULING 
For the reasons stated above the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is Denied. 
Signed this /&- day of July, 2006. 
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